Introduction: the Concepts of Operation and Function
The terms -operation‖ and -function‖ are fundamental in the vocabulary of mathematics, and their meanings are closely related. Nevertheless those meanings are different. Operations, in the mathematical sense, were recognized and used millennia before the emergence of the idea of function. This can be seen above all from the fact that, in arithmetic, addition, multiplication, etc. are called operations, rather than functions. Given that (whole) numbers themselves arise from the fundamental operation of (intransitive) counting, the idea of an operation on numbers emerges almost automatically from the idea of number itself: it has the same kind of immediacy. Of significance also is the fact that numerical operations are homogeneous in that they transform numbers into numbers -like into like. Algebra arose through the recognition that the rules governing arithmetic operations could be extended to wider domains of entities presented as symbols, yet at the same time retaining the homogeneity of the arithmetic operations: for example, fractions by the Babylonians, quadratic expressions by the Hindus, and cubic expressions by the pre-Renaissance Italian mathematicians. Since algebraic operations act on symbols they are intensional in the sense that the result of applying such an operation to a symbol produces another symbol whose identity depends entirely on the identity of the first symbol, rather than on what that symbol may happen to denote-its -value‖.
(By contrast, a procedure whose outputs depend only on the denotations or values of the inputs we shall deem extensional: see below.) For example, 2 2 and 4 both denote the same number; but while 2 2 and 4 both denote the number 2, as symbols they are entirely distinct. Of course, in a simple situation such as this the intensionality is easily -eliminated‖ by the application of rules of reduction, so allowing the derived symbols to be recognized as having the same value. But this is by no means always the case. A profound instance of the irreducible intensionality of algebraic operations in this sense -and a source of great puzzlement to the mathematicians of pre-Renaissance Italy-arose with the effort to solve irreducible cubic equations. As Cardano recognized, if Tartaglia's method is applied to the equation (1) x 3 -15x + 4 = 0, one obtains the solution
But it is immediately clear that (1) is algebraically equivalent to the equation (2) (x -4)(x 2 + 4x + 1) = 0, which has the obvious solution
If we denote by S the operation of solving a cubic equation, then S applied directly to equation (1) yields solution (1*), while S applied to the equivalent equation (2) yields the solution (2*), which is formally quite different from (1*). In this (an algebraically -irreducible‖ case) there are no rules of reduction enabling
(1*) to be transformed into (2*). Thus S is an example of an operation whose intensionality is essentially ineliminable -a truly -irreducible‖ case of intensionality.
Turning now to the concept of function, the idea can be traced to the analysis of motion undertaken by the mathematicians of the 17 th century, specifically, to the study of curves arising as paths of moving points. The term -function‖ in its mathematical sense was first introduced by Leibniz in 1673 to mean any quantity varying from point to point on a given curve (e.g. 2 Nevertheless, it is of interest to observe that the old term fungible, itself derived from -function‖, is defined to mean -capable of mutual substitution‖ or -interchangeable‖; that is, -having the same function‖. This would seem to indicate that the idea of function involved is extensional in the sense specified above.
The Axiom of Choice is essentially the assertion that every nonempty set has at least one covering in this sense. From the passage above it seems clear that for
Zermelo a -covering‖, obtained by associating an arbitrary element to each nonempty subset of a set, is essentially a function (a choice function) given extensionally. Indeed, not only does Zermelo omit to mention how such a function is to be defined, but the purely -numerical‖ (or combinatorial) justification he
gives for the existence of coverings justifies the existence of the corresponding functions only when they are given in the extensional sense. From the assertion that -the number of these coverings is certainly different from 0‖, it does not follow that -there is a covering which can be described.‖ And Zermelo was surely aware of this.
As is well known, Zermelo's use of the Axiom of Choice to prove the Well-Ordering Theorem gave rise to a storm of controversy. He was criticized chiefly on the grounds that in asserting the existence of a -covering‖ or choice function, Zermelo had provided no method of actually defining one. In their insistence that a (choice) function could not be considered to exist unless it was definable, Zermelo's critics were, unconsciously perhaps, cleaving to the old intensional conception of function. I do not think it would be overstepping the bounds of plausibility to maintain that Zermelo's critics were implicitly requiring choice functions to be presented as operations of some kind. In his 1908
formulation of the Axiom of Choice, Zermelo attempts to circumvent the whole issue of definability by replacing the notion of choice function by that of a transversal for a family of sets, but this move failed to silence his sterner crtitics.
Zermelo's 1904 formulation of the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to the assertion, for an arbitrary relation R between sets A, B 
In CAUC amounts to what constructivists call the strong version of Church's thesis, namely the assertion that every total function N  N is recursive. While CAUC is compatible with set theory based on intuitionistic logic-it holds, for example, in the so-called effective topos-it is compatible with the usual set theory based on intuitionistic logic.
A Proposal
All this suggests the desirability of distinguishing the concepts of operation, function, and single-valued relation (i.e. set). Of course, in an important sense this step was taken some time ago by category theory, in which the ideas of operation and function are present in the vastly more general form of morphism or arrow, while the set concept, as such, has disappeared, or at least is present only in a residual sense as the notion of object, which itself can be defined in terms of morphism.
The theory presented here-an elementary theory of operations and sets, ETHOS for short-differs from the theory of categories in that sets, on the one hand, and operations and functions, on the other, are treated on a par: operations and functions are not -reduced‖ to sets of ordered pairs (as in set theory), but neither do sets vanish altogether (as in category theory). It will be formulated as a constructive theory based on intuititionistic logic 3 .
In ETHOS the idea of operation will be taken as primitive: it will be liberated from the -homogeneity‖ condition in that an operation will be allowed to have arbitrary, possibly differing, sets as domain and codomain. Most importantly, the concept of operation will be treated intensionally (as nature intended). The concept of function will play only a secondary role in our scheme.
In fact, the notion will only arise in the form of (extensional) choice function on an indexed family of sets. 4 Finally the concept of set will be entirely distinct from the concept of operation and subject just to rudimentary axioms, similar to those introduced in Bell [2008] . We shall see that ETHOS provides a natural framework for investigating the Axiom of Choice.
The basic language and axioms of ETHOS
Language.
ETHOS is a theory presented in a two-sorted version L of the system of (intuitionistic) predicate logic with partial terms as formulated by Beeson [1985] . The equality relation = in L as to be understood as intensional equality. In this system the rules for the formation of formulas and terms are as usual, but there is an additional rule:
 if t is a term, then t is an atomic formula (-t is defined‖).
The propositional axioms and rules of inference are the usual intuitionistic ones.
The quantifier axioms and rules are as follows: 
In addition L has certain abstraction terms: if t(x) is any term, A(x) any
quantifier-free formula, both containing the free variable x, and U any term of sort SET, then {t(x): A(x)  x  U} is a term of sort SET.
Axioms. ETHOS has two groups of proper axioms
SET axioms 6 .
, where A is any quantifier-free formula.
 t where t is any term of type SET containing only symbols of sort SET  {t(x): A(x)  x  U}, where A is any quantifier-free formula.
OP axioms
In both case the relation  represents extensional equality.
From the OP axioms it is easily deduced that the collection C of sets and operations between them is a quasicategory, that is, satisfies the category axioms with  as composition, the X's as identity arrows and  as the identity relation between operations. In the quasicategorical sense, C has the terminal object 0 and the initial object {0}.
An I-indexed family of subsets of a set A is an operation  such that dom() = I and iI (i)  A. We shall usually write Xi for (i) and <Xi: i  I> for .
The Axiom of Choice in ETHOS 8
ETHOS admits a number of natural formulations of the Axiom of Choice.
Let us call a binary relation (i.e. a set of ordered pairs) R adequate on a set 
and the Axiom of Unique Choice the form
It is easy to see that AC implies AUC.
AUC enables operational relations to be replaced by authentic operations.
This facility will be used principally to define indexed families of subsets. Thus, suppose given sets I, A and a term t(x) such that, for i  I, t(i)  A. Then the relation R = {<i, t(i)>: i  I} is operational on I and so AUC yields an operation  with domain I for which grph()  R. It follows from this that, if we write Xi for t(i), then Xi = (i) and so <Xi: i  I> is an I-indexed family of subsets of A.
Whenever AUC is assumed, we shall introduce indexed families of subsets in this way without further comment.
The Axiom of Choice can also be formulated in terms of indexed families of subsets. Let us define a choice operation on an I-indexed family of subsets <Xi: i  I> of a given set A to be an operation : I  A for which
Now write E for the equivalence relation on I given by i E j  Xi  Xj. An Eextensional choice operation on <Xi: i  I> is called a choice function.
These definitions give rise to two further versions of the Axiom of Choice, namely:
ACO Any indexed family of nonempty 9 subsets of a set admits a choice operation.
ACF

Any indexed family of nonempty subsets of a set admits a choice function.
It is well-known that, in the usual intuitionistic set theory, the Axiom of
Choice implies the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). In ETHOS the situation is 9 Here a set X is said to be nonempty if x. x  X. more involved: there AC only yields LEM if the Axiom of Extensionality (see below) is assumed for sets, and ACF only yields LEM in the presence of AUC. As for ACO, it does not yield LEM even given the Axiom of Extensionality, but it does so if one assumes both AUC and the existence of quotients of equivalence relations (the Axiom of Extensionality is not needed for the derivation).
We shall take the Law of Excluded Middle in the form:
It is to be observed that in this formulation LEM is asserted just for sets, not for operations. Notice that, in ETHOS, LEM is easily deducible from its -local‖ version which asserts that, for any sets
The Axiom of Extensionality for Sets is the sentence
We now prove and so AC applied to the relation
Applying the distributive law, we then get
Now clearly y  U  A  B (both then being  2), and so, assuming Ext,
(1) and (2) yield
i.e. LEM. 
Notice that Ext was needed to obtain (2); in its absence the argument does not go through.
Theorem 2. In ETHOS + AUC, LEM is deducible from ACF.
Proof. We derive LEM in its -local‖ form. Given sets U  A, define I = A  2 and for each i = <a, k>  I let Xi = {n  2: n = k  a  U}. Then <Xi: i  I> is an Iindexed family of nonempty subsets of 2, so ACF yields a choice function on <Xi: i  I>, i.e. an operation : I  2 such that
Now clearly a  U  X<a,0>  X<a,1> (since both are then  2), so that, since  is a choice function,
This, together with (1), gives
whence LEM.  Observe again that the argument requires that  be a choice function rather than merely a choice operation as specified in ACO. The latter is considerably weaker than ACF and not strong enough on its own to yield LEM. We look finally, then, into the problem of specifying additional assumptions sufficient to enable ACO to become equivalent to ACF and hence to yield LEM.
We introduce the following principles:
Quotients. For any equivalence relation  on a set I, there is a set I* and an epi
Representatives. For any equivalence relation  on a set I, there is an operation
Representatives asserts that representatives can be selected from the equivalence classes of any equivalence relation. In ETHOS, Quotients is deducible from Representatives. For, given an equivalence relation  on a set I, let : I  I satisfy (i)  i and i  j  (i) = (j), as provided by Representatives.
Defining I* = {(i): i  I}, and  = | I* , it is easy to verify that : I  I* is epi and Remark. In constructive type theories the version ACO of the Axiom of Choice is actually provable. Since LEM does not hold in these theories, it follows that neither ACF nor Quotients is provable there.
